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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS 
INTEGRATED CARE, : REPLY 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
vs. : 
Case No. 20060255-SC 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political 
subdivision of the State of Utah, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
AN APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, the Hon. Paul G. Maughan presiding. 
(Trial Court Case No. 030901884) 
Plaintiff/Appellant Emergency Physicians Integrated Care ("EPIC") submits the 
following reply brief: 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Salt Lake County (hereinafter "the County") has not filed an appeal. Thus, the 
County's recitation of its "issues presented for review" in EPIC's appeal is not helpful. 
The opening brief filed by appellant, EPIC, sets forth the issues presented for review and 
now before this Court. No other issues are before the court in this matter. Those are: 
1) Whether Salt Lake County has an obligation to pay for emergency medical 
services provided to inmates in its custody by professional providers. 
2) Whether Salt Lake County must pay the reasonable value for emergency 
medical services provided to inmates in Salt Lake County custody by professional 
providers. 
REPLY TO FACTS 
The County stipulates to all but two of the facts set forth by EPIC in its opening 
brief. The County disputes, in part, the following. 
When medical situations arise at the jail, nurses contracted by the County to 
provide services, and who work at the jail, screen the inmates. A nurse 
determines whether the medical care required is either beyond the capacity of 
the medical personnel at the jail to handle or whether emergency medical 
services from outside the jail are necessary. 
Brief of Appellant, p. 5. However, a careful reading shows that the County does not 
really dispute this fact but rather clarifies that "[t]he County employs 48 registered 
licences RNs and LPNs so that there is always an available nurse at the jail." Brief of 
Appellee, p. 5. The County also states that it "contracts with a company called Wellcon 
to provide services at the jail and to be on call, 24-7, to consult with the nursing staff." 
Brief of Appellee, p. 5. These additional "facts" do not dispute nor disagree with EPIC's 
recitation of the facts. 
The County, likewise, disputes the following fact: 
EPIC has requested payment for its emergency medical services provided to 
Salt Lake County jail inmates from the County but, as to some inmates, the 
County has denied that it has any legal duty to pay for the medical services 
provided by EPIC. 
Brief of Appellant, p. 5. Whether the County has a legal duty to pay is, of course, the 
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issue that this Court must resolve. See Brief of Appellant, p. 1 ("Whether Salt Lake 
County has an obligation to pay for emergency medical services provided to inmates in its 
custody by professional providers."). 
REPLY TO THE COUNTY'S ADDITIONAL ASSERTED FACTS 
1. The County asserts that it "paid EPIC at the 'noncapitated' state Medicaid 
rates." Brief of Appellee, p. 5. Relative to their respective billed charges, the rate of 
reimbursement for emergency medical services provided by health care facilities is 
significantly higher than the rate of reimbursement for emergency medical services 
provided by professionals. Parker Aff, *§ 4 (R. 118). While health care facilities are 
reimbursed at a rate of approximately 98% of the health care facility's usual and 
customary charges for emergency room services under the Medicaid schedules, those 
schedules pay only a range of between 18% to 27% of usual and customary emergency 
room physician charges. Parker Aff., \ 5-6 (R. 118); Antinori Aff, f^ 7 (R. 116). 
The billed charges from health care professionals for their services are developed 
by taking into account the training of those professionals, the market in which the 
professionals are working and the overhead associated with the professionals' services. 
The billed charges are the "usual and customary charges" of the physicians and are the 
same regardless of who receives or pays for the services. The billed charges represent the 
reasonable value of the physicians' services. Parker Aff, f^ 7. (R. 119). 
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2. The County asserts that "EPIC sought recovery for its physicians for the 
difference between their billed charges and the statutory rate paid by the County under a 
theory of quantum meruit." Brief of Appellee, p. 6. Throughout its brief, the County 
states that plaintiff only brought claims under quantum meruit. However, rather than 
relying exclusively on quantum meruit, plaintiff raised several legal theories below: 
A) Plaintiff raised a statutory right under Utah Code Ann., § 17-50-319. See 
Plaintiffs Combined Reply Memo & Opp Memo, p. 3-4 (R. 167-168); Plaintiffs 
Supplemental Memo, p., 4-5 (R. 194-195); 
B) Implied in Fact Contract. See Memo in Support of Partial Summary Judgment, 
p. 11 (R. 91); Plaintiffs Combined Reply & Opp Memo., p. 9 (R. 173);1 
C) Implied in Law Contract. See Memo in Support of Partial Summary Judgment, 
p. 11 (R. 91); and, of course, 
D) Quantum Meruit. See Memo in Support of Partial Summary Judgment (R. 81). 
1
 The County claims, incorrectly, that EPIC raises its implied-in-fact contract 
theory for the first time on appeal. Brief of Appellee, p. 6, n.5. EPIC's argument was 
raised below in its Memo in Support of Partial Summary Judgment, p. 11 (R. 91); and 
Plaintiffs Combined Reply & Opp Memo., p. 9 (R. 173). It was likewise addressed by 
the County in its Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and 
& Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 16 (R. 150). 
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SUMMARY OF EPIC'S REPLY ARGUMENT 
The County has an obligation to compensate EPIC for medical services provided 
to individuals in the custody of Salt Lake County. Salt Lake County receives a substantial 
benefit as a result of the medical treatment provided to County jail inmates by EPIC 
physicians. The County discharges a key constitutional duty by using EPIC doctors. The 
benefit includes money the County saves by not retaining the full-time services of a staff 
of physicians capable of dealing with all emergency care that may arise at the jail, along 
with associated savings of overhead costs. In addition, the County minimizes the 
damages it might be required to pay inmates who would otherwise bring suit for damages 
resulting from the failure to provide any emergency medical care at the jail. 
The County relies upon poorly reasoned analysis in Myrtle Beach Hospital, Inc. v. 
City of Myrtle Beach. 532 S.E.2d 868 (S.C. 2000). Rather, the weight of case law holds 
against the lower court decision. The health care facility in Myrtle Beach sought 
reimbursement for medical care rendered to pre-trial detainees. South Carolina had 
several statutes related to the treatment and expenses related to post-conviction inmates, 
but not pre-trial detainees. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that those statutes 
expressed legislative intent that jailers should bear expenses, including health care 
expenses, for inmates following their convictions, but they did not apply to pre-trial 
detainees. The relevant Utah statute (Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319) makes no distinction 
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between pre-trial and post-conviction detainees. Utah obligates counties to provide for 
both. 
In addition, in its analysis of the degree to which the municipality benefits from 
emergency services, the Myrtle Beach case is poorly reasoned. Relegated to a footnote is 
the acknowledgment that the municipality obtains benefit by satisfying its Constitutional 
duty to ensure that inmates receive medical care. However, the Myrtle Beach court 
characterizes this benefit as "incidental," brushing aside the fact that obtaining competent 
medical care for jail inmates discharges Constitutional and common law duties that, were 
they breached, would give rise to costly tort claims for liability against the municipality. 
The County argues that a 2001 amendment changed the statutory landscape, but 
this is not correct. The legislature in 2001 added a statute governing medical expenses of 
health care facilities. The legislature did not alter the pre-2001 statutes that were read by 
the County to include compensation to professional medical care providers like EPIC. 
The language of Utah Code makes clear the legislature's intent that the County pay 
for expenses necessarily incurred in operating its jail system. The categories of expenses 
listed in the statute that are relevant to, and broad enough to cover, emergency medical 
services provided by EPIC to County jail inmates. 
Legislative history also makes clear that the Utah Legislature intended that the 
County pay for medical services rendered to county inmates and detainees by health care 
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professionals as well as health care facilities. There was no legislative intent to divest 
professional health care providers from payment for services rendered to those in county 
custody. Finally, the legislative history debunks the County's argument that legislature 
intended to exclude physicians from payment. 
EPIC'S REPLY ARGUMENT 
I. THE COUNTY HAS AN OBLIGATION TO COMPENSATE EPIC FOR 
MEDICAL SERVICES PROVIDED TO INDIVIDUALS IN THE CUSTODY 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY. 
The crux of the County's argument is that "no significant benefit was conferred 
upon the County by [EPIC]" thus justifying no payment to EPIC for the services rendered 
by its medical professionals.2 Brief of Appellee, p. 1. That analysis, however, is 
inadequate and minimizes the benefit received by the County by utilizing EPIC providers. 
There is no question that Salt Lake County receives a substantial benefit as a result 
of the medical treatment provided to County jail inmates by EPIC physicians. Foremost, 
the County discharges a key Constitutional duty by using EPIC doctors. The U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that governments are Constitutionally required to provide necessary 
medical care to individuals who are in governmental custody or have been detained. City 
2
 The County asserts that it has reimbursed EPIC providers "at the 'noncapitated' 
state Medicaid rate." Brief of Appellee, p. 5. However, the holding of the court below 
suggests that counties need not pay for any of the medical expenses incurred by health 
care professional rendered for inmates. Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 5. 
7 
of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital. 463 U.S. 239, 244-45 (1983). The 
Supreme Court indicated that: " . . . as long as the governmental entity ensures that the 
medical care needed is in fact provided, the Constitution does not dictate how the cost of 
that care should be allocated as between the entity and the provider of the care. That is a 
matter of state law." 463 U.S. at 245. However, the Supreme Court also stated, "if. . . 
the governmental entity can obtain the medical care needed for a detainee only by paying 
for it, then it must pay . . . ." Revere. 463 U.S. at 244-246. The County glosses over this 
mandate in Revere. The Supreme Court's language simply does not justify the County 
sticking EPIC providers with the cost of emergency services rendered to County 
detainees. 
The benefit to the County also includes money the County saves by not retaining 
the full-time services of a staff of physicians capable of dealing with all emergency care 
that may arise at the jail, along with associated savings of overhead costs associated with 
maintaining a health care facility at the jail that is capable of handling a wide variety of 
medical needs. Rather, the County has chosen to utilize health care professionals, 
including EPIC providers, from outside the jail to perform emergency services. 
The benefit that the County realizes is measured, in part, by the degree to which 
the County reduces its exposure to pay significant consequential damages to inmates 
harmed by the County's failure to provide reasonably necessary emergency medical care 
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to jail inmates. By relying on the expertise of EPIC physicians, the County minimizes the 
damages it might be required to pay inmates who would otherwise bring suit for damages 
resulting from the failure to provide any emergency medical care (civil right actions), or 
incompetent emergency medical care (malpractice actions), at the jail. 
Likewise, EPIC confers a significant public benefit on the County. Utilizing EPIC 
physicians to meet the needs of the County in providing emergency medical services to 
jail inmates is a significantly more efficient method by which the County may fulfill its 
Constitutional obligation than by duplicating EPIC's professionals and ancillary resources 
at the jail. Establishing a new health care delivery system at the jail with the range of 
medical services, including providing doctors, equipment and facilities that exist in the 
private sector for treatment of emergency conditions is not a wise use of tax-payer funds. 
These services provided by EPIC confer much more that an "incidental" value on 
Salt Lake County. Without the availability of emergency medical services, the County 
would be exposed to enormous financial liability to its jail population for failing to 
provide necessary medical care. The benefit conferred on the County by EPIC obligates 
the County to pay for the reasonable value of EPIC's services. Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 
264, 269 (Utah App. 1987). 
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H. MYRTLE BEACH IS POORLY REASONED, DISTINGUISHABLE AND 
AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF CASE LAW. 
The County's reliance on Myrtle Beach Hospital, Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach. 532 
S.E.2d 868 (S.C. 2000) is misplaced. The County claims that the Myrtle Beach court 
"reasoned that the state legislature, by requiring county and state jailers to pay for medical 
care, necessarily excluded cities from that obligation by omitting them from the statutes." 
Brief of Appellee, at 11. The distinction drawn in that case was, to a degree, between 
pre-trial detainees and post-conviction detainees. Id at 532 S.E.2d at 871 ("these statutes 
express the legislative intent that jailers (whether county of state) are to bear the 
expenses, including those incurred in rendering health care, for persons incarcerated 
following their convictions."). The health care facility in Myrtle Beach sought 
reimbursement for medical care rendered to pre-trial detainees. Id. at 869. South 
Carolina had several statutes related to the treatment and expenses related to post-
conviction inmates, but not pre-trial detainees. The South Carolina Supreme Court found 
that those statutes expressed legislative intent that jailers should bear expenses, including 
health care expenses, for inmates following their convictions, but they did not apply to 
pre-trial detainees. Id. at 871. 
The relevant Utah statute (Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319) makes no distinction 
between pre-trial and post-conviction detainees. Utah obligates counties to provide for 
both. A comparison is helpful. The statutes in Myrtle Beach included 
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statutes expressing the State's policy to render "humane treatment" to 
persons serving a term in the State Penitentiary, S.C. Code Ann. § 24-1-20 
(1989); to one instructing that the DOC director is responsible "for the 
proper care, treatment, feeding, clothing, and management of the prisoners 
confined therein", S.C. Code Ann. § 24-1-130 (Supp. 1999); a statute 
requiring certain entities using state convicts to reimburse the DOC for 
"moneys expended . . . for medical attention . . . ." S.C. Code Ann. § 24-1-
160 (Supp. 1999); and, to provisions made for the comfort and treatment of 
prisoners in county jail [§ 24-5-80 and § 24-7-70 (1985)] and of convicts 
working on chain gangs. §§ 24-7-60; 24-7-80; 24-7-110 (1985). 
Myrtle Beach, 532 S.E.2d at 871. Utah's statutes compel similar obligations: 
(1) County charges are: 
(a) those incurred against the county by any law; 
(b) the necessary expenses of the county attorney or district attorney 
incurred in criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses 
necessarily incurred by the county or district attorney in the prosecution 
of criminal cases, except jury and witness fees; 
(c) the expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged 
with or convicted of a criminal offense and committed to the county 
jail; 
* * * 
(f) the contingent expenses necessarily incurred for the use and benefit 
of the county; 
(i) the necessary expenses of the sheriff and deputies incurred in civil 
and criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses 
necessarily incurred by the sheriff and deputies performing the duties 
imposed upon them by law . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 (l)(a)-(c), (f)&(g). As noted, Utah's statute makes no 
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distinction between pre-trial and post-conviction detainees. Indeed, it obligates counties 
to pay "the expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged with or 
convicted of a criminal offense and committed to the county jail." Utah Code Ann. §17-
50-319(l)(c) (emphasis added). 
In addition, in its analysis of the degree to which the municipality benefits from 
emergency services, the Myrtle Beach case is poorly reasoned. Relegated to a footnote is 
the acknowledgment that City of Myrtle Beach obtained any benefit by satisfying its 
Constitutional duty to ensure that inmates received medical care. Myrtle Beach, 532 
S.E.2d at 873, n.12. The footnote characterizes this benefit as "incidental" and brushes 
aside the fact that obtaining competent medical care for jail inmates discharges 
Constitutional and common law duties that, were they breached, would give rise to costly 
tort claims for liability against the City.3 
This significant financial exposure was also acknowledged as a reality in this case 
by Captain Dial in his deposition at pp. 14:23-15:3 (R. 101). Indeed, if the County does 
not provide or arrange for the provision of competent emergency medical services to 
inmates in need of those services, the County acknowledges it may be liable to inmates 
for damages arising out of the failure to provide those services. Id. Thus, the value of 
3
 The same reasoning was, in error, adopted by the court below in this case. 
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having EPIC available as a means to discharge the County's Constitutional imperative in 
this case is not "incidental." 
The County asserts that this case is distinguishable from Poudre Valley Health 
Care, Inc.. v. City of Loveland, 85 P.3d 558 (Colo. App. 2003). An examination of the 
County's arguments show its error. First, the County concedes that the statutory scheme 
in Poudre Valley is similar to Utah's statutory scheme—the County states that Poudre 
Valley "involves a statute, similar to Utah's before the 2001 amendment, which does not 
include an express allocation of medical costs." Brief of Appellee, p. 18. Next, the 
County admits that it "interpreted [Utah's] statute in much the same way that the Poudre 
Valley court interpreted Colorado's statute and paid for the medical expenses billed." 
Brief of Appellee, p. 18. 
However, the County argues that a 2001 amendment changed the statutory 
landscape. The County is mistaken. The legislature in 2001 added a statute governing 
medical expenses of health care facilities (Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319). The legislature 
did not alter the pre-2001 statutes (Utah Code Ann. §17-22-8 & Utah Code Ann. §17-15-
174) that were read by the County to include compensation to professional medical care 
providers like EPIC. See Brief of Appellee, p. 18. 
4
 Utah Code Ann. §17-15-17 was renumbered in 2000 to §17-50-319. 
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In Poudre Valley the issue was "whether a governmental entity has an obligation to 
pay for outside medical costs incurred in the care and treatment of a pretrial detainee in its 
custody." Id. at 559. The Colorado Court of Appeals recognized, according to Revere. 
that it "must apply Colorado law in determining whether the City is liable for the costs 
incurred by the Hospital in affording medical care and treatment to the pretrial detainee." 
Id. Similar to the facts herein, there was no Colorado statute that expressly addressed the 
issue. IcL at 560. However, the court found that the general statute regarding persons in 
custody contained an implied obligation to pay the costs of medical care. The Colorado 
statute reads: 
Persons arrested or in custody shall be treated humanely and shall be provided 
with adequate food, shelter, and, if required, medical treatment. 
Colorado Rev. Statutes § 16-3-401 (2) (2002). Thus, the court found, 
where . . . a state statute unambiguously imposes a duty on governmental 
entities to provide medical treatment and care for detainees in their custody, 
such a duty includes or, at a minimum, implies an inherent obligation to pay 
the costs of such treatment and care. 
Poudre Valley. 85P.3dat561. Utah imposes a similar duty on counties for "the expenses 
necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged with or convicted of a criminal 
offense and committed to the county jail." Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 (1) (b). 
The County asserts that because the statute in Poudre Valley specifically charged 
counties with ensuring and/or providing "medical care", there is a concomitant and 
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inherent duty to pay. In contrast, according to the County, because Utah's statute does 
not explicitly charge counties to provide medical care, the County does not have to pay 
such expenses. The argument is without merit because, independent of state law, the 
County has a Constitutional duty under Revere to provide such care. The fact that the 
pre-existing constitutional duty is not written into state statutes does not waive nor relieve 
the County of its Constitutional duty. The distinction the County attempts to draw does 
not, in reality, exist. 
As noted, the County concedes that they historically understood Utah's statutes 
(Utah Code Ann. §17-22-8 & Utah Code Ann. §17-15-17) to compel them to pay medical 
expenses and indeed "paid for the medical expenses billed." Brief of Appellee, p. 18. 
The County merely saw a change to Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319, unrelated to medical 
care professionals, as an opportunity to stop paying professional medical care providers at 
the billed rates. That section did not alter those statutes that the County previously read to 
require payment to health care providers. Rather, it merely added a specific clause 
regarding health care facilities. As set forth more fully below, the legislative history 
regarding Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 makes clear that the County's reading of that 
statute is inaccurate. 
Finally, the County ignores Union County v. Warner Brown Hospital 762 S.W.2d 
798 (Ark. 1989). That case is directly on point with the facts herein. In Union County 
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"the trial court did not rely on any [Arkansas] statutes dealing with payment of costs of 
services to persons held in county jails." Id at 799. Indeed, there was not statute that 
mandated the provision of medical expenses to those in county custody. Rather, similar 
to Utah's statutory scheme, there was a general statute mandating payment of "expenses 
of carrying a person to jail and for his support while he remains there." IdL In Arkansas, 
those expenses are first paid by the inmate, but "if sufficient property belonging to the 
defendant cannot be found to pay costs and fees, they shall be paid by the county . . . ." 
Id. Those statutes were sufficient to impose an obligation on the county to pay medical 
providers their billed charges. Indeed, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that Revere 
itself was properly interpreted by requiring that governmental entities do more than 
simply deliver individuals to a facility. The governmental entity must ". . . supply the 
necessary treatment and if it can obtain such treatment only by paying for it, then it must 
do so." Union County, 762 S.W.2d at 799 (emphasis in original). 
III. THE TERMS OF UTAH CODE ANN. §17-50-319 REQUIRE THE COUNTY 
TO PAY FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES OF JAIL INMATES. 
The County attempts to limit EPIC's claims solely to a theory of quantum meruit. 
However, EPIC is the master of its claim, Karnes v. Boeing Co.. 335 F.3d 1189, 1192-
1193 (10th Cir. 2003), and it clearly raised claims under Utah's statutory scheme. The 
language of Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 makes clear the legislature's intent that the 
County pay for expenses necessarily incurred in operating its jail system. The categories 
16 
of expenses listed in the statute that are relevant to, and broad enough to cover, 
emergency medical services provided by EPIC to County jail inmates. 
Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 lists charges and expenses for which the County is 
responsible: 
(1) County charges are: 
(a) those incurred against the county by any law; 
(b) the necessary expenses of the county attorney or district attorney 
incurred in criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses 
necessarily incurred by the county or district attorney in the prosecution 
of criminal cases, except jury and witness fees; 
(c) the expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged 
with or convicted of a criminal offense and committed to the county 
jail; 
* * * 
(f) the contingent expenses necessarily incurred for the use and benefit 
of the county; 
* * * 
(i) the necessary expenses of the sheriff and deputies incurred in civil 
and criminal cases arising in the county, and all other expenses 
necessarily incurred by the sheriff and deputies performing the duties 
imposed upon them by law . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 (l)(a)-(c), (f)&(g). These provisions provide a sufficient 
basis to conclude that emergency medical expenses incurred by County jail inmates are 
"county charges" for which the County is responsible to pay. 
The County asserts that there are competing statutory provisions dealing with 
compensation for medical care rendered to inmates and that where one is specific and one 
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is general, the specific statute applies. Brief of Appellee, p. 20. The County's analysis is 
flawed. There are no competing statutes.5 There is no statute that addresses payment to 
professional medical care providers. However, there is a statute requiring the County to 
pay for "the expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons charged with or 
convicted of a criminal offenses and committed to the county jail." Emergency medical 
expenses for jailed inmates are certainly "expenses necessarily incurred." Furthermore, 
there is a Constitutional mandate that the County must provide such care. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has indicated that if the County can only obtain such care by paying for it, 
the it must simply pay. Finally, there is the legislative history that makes clear the Utah 
Legislature's intent that County in fact pay for such care. 
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MAKES CLEAR THAT THE UTAH 
LEGISLATURE INTENDS MEDICAL SERVICES RENDERED TO 
COUNTY INMATES AND DETAINEES SHOULD BE PAID BY THE 
COUNTY. 
The legislative history of Utah Code Ann. §17-50-319 makes clear that EPIC's 
position is correct. The language reads as follows: 
It is the intent of the Legislature to clarify that physicians and other health 
care providers have been purposefully omitted from S.B. 152 because of the 
recognition and continued commitment of counties and physicians to work 
5
 If the Utah code contained one statute generally mandating that counties must 
pay for emergency medical care to inmates, and a separate statute indicating that medical 
care for inmates must be paid at a certain rate, then defendant's analysis might apply. 
However, that hypothetical is simply not the situation at bar. 
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out prisoner reimbursement issues without legislation and because of the 
considerable difference in medicaid reimbursement rates for physicians as 
compared to hospitals. 
Intent Language for SB 152, House and Senate Journals (R. 127-128) (also attached 
hereto as Addendum "A"). This specific language debunks the County's argument that 
legislature intended to exclude physicians from the scope of the County's obligations to 
pay for necessary medical services to jail inmates and detainees. See Brief of Appellee, p. 
19 ("Utah's legislature has specifically addressed the issue of the allocation of medical 
costs of jail inmate[s], and has excluded physicians."). Indeed, the relevant legislative 
intent could not be clearer in recognizing that emergency physicians and other 
professional health care providers should get paid, and that the payment should be higher 
than the uncapitated medicaid rates. 
The undisputed facts below establish that there is a significant disparity in the 
medicaid payment rates payment between health care facilities and professional health 
care providers. Expenses for medical services provided by physicians are billed 
separately from those provided by hospitals or other health care facilities. EPIC's 
"Statement of Undisputed Material Facts," 111 (R. 85); The fee schedules developed by 
the Utah Medicaid Program differentiate between payment for professional services and 
payment for healthcare facility charges. EPIC's "Statement of Undisputed Material 
Facts," f 12 (R. 85). During legislative debate on amendment to U.C.A. §17-50-319 in 
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2001, references to "health care provider" were purposely deleted from the legislation to 
ensure that health care professionals, as opposed to health care facilities, were not 
compelled to accept payment for their services at Medicaid rates. EPIC's "Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts," T| 14 (R. 85-86). Finally, the reason health care professionals 
opted out of the amendments to U.C.A. §17-50-319 in 2001 was due to the significant 
disparity between reimbursement rates for healthcare facilities and healthcare 
professionals under the Utah State Medicaid Schedules. EPIC's "Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts," 115 (R. 86). 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The County has a Constitutional obligation to provide necessary medical care to its 
inmates. To the extent it fails to carry out this Constitutional duty, it may be liable to a 
claim for damages arising out of harm caused to inmates. Consequently, the County 
regularly utilizes the services of private health care facilities and professional medical 
providers to discharge its Constitutional obligation. 
The services provided to jail inmates by EPIC physicians confer a significant 
benefit on the County. Under the circumstances of this case, it would be unjust for the 
County to retain that benefit without paying for it. The County should at least be required 
to pay the reasonable market value of the services provided by EPIC, the billed charges of 
the physicians for their services. 
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This Court should overturn the lower court ruling, and require the County to pay 
the billed charges of the EPIC physicians. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of SEPTEMBER 2006. 
Attorneys for PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
BRIAN S. |CING 
JAMES L. JHARRIS, Jr. 
21 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to: 
David Yocom 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
Donald H. Hansen 
Melanie Mitchell 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS 
2001 South State Street, S3700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
on the 8th day of SEPTEMBER, 2006, postage prepaid in the United States Postal Service. 




Attachment "A": Intent Language for SB 152 
In the House and Senate Journals. 
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APPENDIX "A 
Intent Language for SB 152 
In the House and Senate Journals 
OCT-iB-2004 16:35 UTAH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 8 0 1 &32 lbt>U Jf .UZ 
INTENT LANGUAGE FOR SB 152 
IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE JOURNALS 
As reflected on pagell826 of the Ho*se Journal for the 2001 General Session; 
S3 .152 , MflDICAL EXPEltSES OF COUNTY INMATES, read the third time by short 
title and plactd on its final passage. 
On motion oil Representative Holladay, the bill was amended as follows: 
L Page 2, Lime 36a: Senate 3rd Reading Amendments 2-16-2001: Delete "health care 
provider or" 
S.B, 152, as amended, then passed on the following roll call: 
Yeas, 56; Naflys, 8; Absent ofr not voting, 11. 
Voting in theilaffinnative weiie: Representatives Aagard Adair S. Allen Arent Beck 
Becker Bennion Bes hear Bi^elow Biskupsld Bourdeaux Bowman Bradshaw Bryson 
Buffinire S. (Mark D, Cox G, Cox Curtis Daniels Dillree Duckworth Ferrin Feny Fife 
Garn Goodfellow Hansen Harper Hendrickson Hogue Holdaway Holladay Jones Litvac k 
Lockhart McCartney Morgan Moss Murray Newbold Pac e Peterson Philpot Ray Seitz 
Shurtliff Siddoway G. Snow Btyler Thompson Throckmorton Tyler Wallace Winn Young 
Voting in ttafc negative wera: Representatives Anderson Bush D. Clark Dayton Hatch B, 
Johnson Parser Saunders 
Absent or not voting were: Representatives Alexander Barrus Buttars Donnelson 
Gowans King Swallow Ure uJrquhart Way M. Stephens 
S.B. 152, as Amended, was rAtumed to the Senate for further consideration. 
INTENT LANGUAGE FOfc S.B. 152 
It is the inteift of the Legislature to clarify that physicians and other health care providers 
have been purposefully omitted from S JB. 152 because of the recognition and continued 
commitmentlof counties and|physicians to work out prisoner reimbursement issues 
without legislation and because of the considerable difference in Medicaid 
reimbursement rates for phyfcicians as compared to hospitals. 
Iz. J 
As reflected on page 1627 of Senate Journal for the 2001 General Session: 
OCT-18-2004 16:35 UTAH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 801 532 1&&U r.uo 
The House passed, as amendtt, S.B. 152, MEDICAL EXPENSES OF COUNTY 
INMATES, bllv Senator M. Waddoups, and it is transmitted for further consideration. 
On motion ofl Senator Wadddups, the Senate voted to concur in the House amendments to 
S.B, 152, Thfl bill, as amenddd. passed on the following roll call; 
Yeas, 26; Nays, 0; Absent, 3. 
Voting in the affirmative weife: Senators E. Allen R. Allen Bramble Buttars Davis 
Dmitrich Easima n Evans Glidwell Hale Hellewell Hillyard Jenkins Ju lander Knudson 
Mayne Peterson Poulton Spehcer Stephenso n Suazo Valentine Waddoups Walker 
Wright Mansfcll 
Absent or nonvoting were: Sfcnators Blackham Hickman Steele 
S.B. 152 was returned to the House. 
INTENT LANGUAGE TO S B. 152 
It is the intern of the Legislature to clarify that physicians and other health care providers 
have been puiposefiilly omitted from S>B. 152 because of the recognition and continued 
commitment Df counties and physicians to work out prisoner reimbursement issues 
without legislation because of the considerable difference in Medicaid reimbursement 
rates for physicians as compared to hospitals. 
Li„. i 
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